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Abstract 
The author aims to dev巴lopsome n旦lV巴constructionof a theory of events 0ロthefooting th呂ta umv巴rse
of primitive objects is fixed and axiomatics is taken to fit to the research of events occurring in this universe 
The whole system is possibly considered to be revised historicaly. Logic thereupon is claim巴dto work 0口
beyond the intuitionism 
1. Introduction 
In this study of logical consistency of an analysis， inproviding axiomatics we make much 
of the epistemological correlations to be claimed on its objects. This will be a way which 
interests us rather in material axiomatics than formal one. A universe of primitive objects 
might primarily be concerned with technical operations allowed by axiomatics provided for it， 
so that， ifany paradox was found， the universe itself might possibly be taken as a sourse of 
that paradox. But， such may not be the case when a universe U is taken in itself to make 
the basic ground of events and axioms are thereupon postulated to admit some naive theory 
of events occurring in U. In fact some universes seem to have been from' the outset 
admitted before axiomatics for them. For instance， the real axis has been used in geometry 
before any theory of irrational numbers was completed. Moreover， the euclidean geometry 
was perhaps essentially thought to be unchangeably absolute even when some additional 
axioms were by D. Hilbert discovered to be needed.1) Thus， ifa unverse is esteemed to be 
original to be unchangeably fixed， itis called an objectivist universe， and if we then intend to 
build up a theory of events based on that universe， the theory is called an objectivist theory or 
an objectivism 
In material axiomatics， axiorns are postulad as the facts which are mentally convinced to 
hold except that there are found no rigorous means to demonstrate them. They are the 
results of human observations and so， ifany contradiction is factually ascribed to some 
axioms， they must then be eliminated from the system ofaxioms and if needed altered or 
supplemented. Such is the common manner destined to al objectivist theories. Because of 
this manner an objectivism may be said to develop its course of analysis naturally and 
historically， perhaps sometimes with revisions ofaxiomatics. 
2. Consistency 
As a cogent logical complement for objectivist devices， we may adopt the emρiricist 
ρragmatism. This is the dogmatism which epistemologically scrutenizes over al places 
* 紀国谷芳雄
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fundamental to axiomatic researches and claims to renounce what cannot have any 
authenticity beyond mere fictive presentation， as meaningless. 
Ifaxiomatics is based only on observational trials over an objectivist universe under the 
empiricist pramgmatism， itis ca11ed objectivist axiomatics. In such a system it is possibly 
prornised to have some axioms altered or supplernented if any essential contradiction is 
revealed. Thus the axioms to date possessed cannot a1 be considered as absolute. In this 
meaning of historical subsurnption， we particularly ca1 the ρroto-system ofaxiorns the systern 
ofaxioms to date possessed， and the ρroωconstruction the co11ection of a1 axioms， definitions 
and theorems to date obtained 
It should be so constituted that any rea! contradiction rnay be retraced and ascribed to 
the corresponding contrarieties amog the axioms. Thus revisions of the proto-construction 
are to be applied who11y to the proto-system ofaxioms. After aロyrevision， the thereafter 
newly obtained construction (ofaxioms， defintions and theorerns) gives again a proto 
construction. By grace of such a historical renovation， an objectivism may be regarded to be 
free from real contradiction and be aimed only its perfect consistency， though， despite of the 
human desire， the present appearance of consistency may not be convinced in itself toward 
the future beyond the realm of the proto-construction， In fact， this apparent consistency is 
a sort of consistency which has been ca11ed empirical.2) When we necessarily try some 
renovation for the proto.construction， there rnay possibly be found an opportunity to look 
upon it with sorne connotation， that is， epistemological insight therewith to be connected. 
3. Law of Excluded Middle 
The law of excluded middle in respect of (lst-order) predicates has been prevalently used 
when limited its application to a finite set of objects， but when applied to an infinite set of 
them it was sornetimes overtly objected， particularly by the intuitionist schoo1.3) Incidenta11y 
the conception itself of infinite sets has also been exposed to several hot discussions 
An enumerable set rnay be defined as a set of elernents which can be enurnerated along 
the natural nurnbers in order， but whether it reaches the infinity or not rnust be abstained 
from discussion. By the way， the structure of an enumerable set can be considered to 
correspond to the procedure of rnathernatical induction. 
Principle of Elementwise (l'v1athematical) Induction. Jf N= 1， 2， ..and if the following 
two conditions are admitted to be satisfied， itis tated that (V nεN) (F(n) is true) : (i)F (l) is 
true; (i) if n ε N and F (n) is true， then so is F(ηトー1).
This may be thought as a definition which also involvelves the generation of an 
enurntrable set itself， that is : (i)alεA; (i) an ε A.コ • an+l E A then A is determined 
to contain an enumerable set. Moreover， the law of excluded rniddle in respect of a predicate 
p rnay be warranted for an enumerable set A = 1 a1，a2，…f if(1) pal.V. ~pal， and (ii) 
pan. V. ~ pan:コ:pan+l.V.~pan+l・ Inthis case we render it 
(V n)(pan.V.~ pan). 
On accepting the conception of an enurnerable set， itis certainly concluded that an 
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enumerable set must be an infinite set. However， itis to be noted that， ifA = 1 a1， a2， ••• f 
and An = 1 a1， a2，…，anf ' then the remainder 
Rn =A - An二...{an+b an+2，…| 
is always an enumerable infinite set too， and can moreover be put into 1 -1 correspondence 
to A， that is， the enumerability is of unfinishing type.4) This may be thought to be an 
inherent property of the set of natural numbers. 
1n case of a general infinite set A， the primary meaning of the sentence 
(Vαε A)(pa.V.~ pa) (3.1) 
inevitably in itself comes into question. However、ifthere is no a really to fail in the 
condition 
α モ A.&:pα.V.~pα ，
then (3.1) may eventually be rendered “For each element a of the set A it is warranted that 
pα.V.~pa:' 
So， let us inversely define such that， if
~(ヨ α モ A)(~(pα.V.~pα)) ，
the property P is said to be 'elementwise well-defined" in the set A. Thus the law of 
excluded middle in respect of a predicate P is warranted for a set A if P is considered to be 
elementwise well-defined in A. 
1n a previous paper5)we defined a predicate P to be called descrψtive in a set A if P 
fulfils the condition (3.1) there. If R (p) indicates the total set of the elements a for which 
Pa is true， R(P) is the range of p. "R(p)cR(q)" is thought tobe equivalent to the 
implication "pコq':
4. Objectivist Propositions 
Let the language for an objectivism being developed on a given objectivist universe U be 
denoted by Lu. Lu may primarily be introduced in terms of any word language， say Eng-
lish， French， etc.， and possibly be helped by that language whenever needed. 
Suppose that there is a class Fs of sets in U and is given a relation f which assigns an 
object f(A) to each set A of Fs and a certain property p is to be examined if f(A) fulfils i t 
or not. Then f (A ) iscalled a configuratiω1 on A (with respect to f). We assume F忌 tobe 
the largest class of wich every set A may be assigned a unique configuration by means of f， 
and cal i t he class ゲメcoηifiguration.
Denoting as 
ρ(f， A)二 (f(A)fulfils P ) 
we cal an event defined by 
αニ ρ(f，A) (4.1) 
an elementary objectivist event or elliptically an (objectivist) event if there is no fear to be 
complicated. If we define a proposition S by one of the following three sorts of statements 
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(I) 8:AεFs.コ.ρ(f，A) is true (or valid); 
(I) 8: AεFs.二人ρ(f.A) is possible; 
(II) 8: AεFs.コ.ρ(f， A) is impossible; 
then we cal 8 an elementary objectivist proposition or elliptically an objectivistρroposition or a 
ρroposition if there is no fear of complication. When a proposition is in a certain way 
explicated out， we shall use 8 (A) instead of f (A) and instead of (4.1) we write as 
α二 ρ(S，A) (4.2) 
Since we (for the present) convince the proto-system ofaxioms to be consistent， we may 
expect any event to be true if it is derived from the proto-construction. Thus， in this view， 
to say an event to be true is of the same meaning as to say it to be valid 
Ifρ(8， A) is valid， a iscalled anωσmple of 8， and if impossible (or invalid) a counter-
examρle of 8. By L(8) we mean the set of al events αdefind by (4.1) (or by (4.2) and cal 
it the level of the proposition S. Denoting as 
and 
if we have 
E(8)={α|αis an example of 8} 
C(8)={α|αis a counterexample of 8}， 
L(8)=E(8)U C(8)， 
then we say 8 to be a decidable (or descrかtive)proposition. If L(8)=ダ， 8 is called vac-
uous 
When a proposition 8 is not vacuous and is decidable， ifC(8)ニダ， 8 is a theorem in 
case of type (1) or (I)， and if E( 8)ニダ， 8 is a false proposition or a fallacy in case of type (I) 
or (I)， but is a theorem in case of type (II). 
We claim that the collection of al objectivist propositions in a given objectivism can be 
made enumerated. Let the enumeration indices of the propositions (with respect to an 
enumeration) be called Godel numbers. When we actually take up a proposition 8， Godel 
numbers precedent to that of 8 make up together at most only a finite set. In this meaning 
we say "8 is set on a finite stage". Inversely， naive admission of the fact that any objectiv-
ist proposition， if actually taken up for analysis， must necessarily be set on a finite stage (in 
the proto-construction)， may be assumed to induce the enumerability of the total collection of 
the objectivist propositions (with the aid of the notion of historical proceeding). 
5. Negation of a Proposition 
If 8 is a theorem we write '卜S'.Then， if8 is a decidable proposition， we have 
ト 8.v.~ ト 8. (5.1) 
By several authors， instead of (5.1) it has been written as 
8.v.~ S. 
However， the expression '~8' is not generally to be connected to the same content as ，~卜 s
because the expression ぞ~8' must properly suggest the collection of al propositions the 
levels of which are really different from L( 8) and モ~8' thus cannot work to be on a finite 
stage. This being so， we shall treat the expression そ~8' as a metalogical object alien 
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from the present implementation of an objectivism. 
When S is a (non-vacuous) decidable proposition， we may constitutionally have the 
following stipulations: 
トS=(C(S)ニダ) and ~ト S=(C(S) ヰダ)
in case of type (I) and 
トS=(E(S)ヰダ) and ~ト S=(E(S)= 〆)
in case of type (I). Thus we shall accordingly stipulate that 
~ (A is B)= (A is not B)， ~ (A is not B)ニ (Ais 島，
~(Aニコ島ェ (A争B) ， ~(Aゃ島=(A=中B) ，
and cal the sign ぞ~， in this usage the binary negation. In this context we may have 
~ ~(A is B)=(A is B)， ~ ~(A is not B)二 (Ais not B)， 
~~(A土中島=(A二今B) ， ~ ~(A争B)=(AゎB)，
and subsequently 
~(X(S)= 〆 )=(X(S) ヰ:: o)， ~(X(S) 宇五百 )=(X(S)= ダ)， 
~ ~ (X(S)ニダ)二(X(S)工戸)， ~ ~(X(S) ヰダ)二 (X(S) 宇五百)， 
where X(S) renders either E(S) or C(S). Thus we may have 
~~ト S= 卜 S*J
on condition that そ~' is the binary negation， when S is an objectivist proposition. 
6. Decision 
(5.2) 
If Y is neither a valid event nor an invalid one and yet appears to be occurrable (in 
respect of some statement to define it) on an objectivist universe U， then Y is said to give a日
undecidable event for the proto-construction on U. If an elementary objectivist proposition 
Q isneither valid nor invalid， then Q isan undecidableρrotosition. In this case we may have 
a parti ti on of L ( Q) such that 
L ( Q) = E( Q) U C ( Q)U D( Q) (5.1) 
and D( Q) consists of al undecidable events in respect to the proposition Q. 
In this section we restrict Q to be a proposition of type (I). Then if C( Q)ヰダ，Qis 
decided as a fallacy. So， for a proposition Q to be undecidable it is necessary that 
C(Q)二五ず.
If Y is an undecidable event， itmay not be difficult to see that Y isassumable as well 
to be valid as to be invalid， that is， whether Y is assumed to be valid or invalid cannot be 
affected by the proto-system ofaxioms. So then， ifwe make an axiom which claims that 
Y is a valid event on U and add it to the proto-system ofaxoms， consistency of the constrction 
may yet hold on. 
* ) Thisformula has口otbeen admitted by the intuitionists when no such stipulations as above-stat巴dhav巴
be巴nmade 
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ln case of (5.1)， if Q is certainly undecidable， some events of D( Q) may， by virtue of the 
above reasoning， be assumed as simultaneously valid to be added to the proto-construction， 
with no affection to its consistency. Thus， ifJ)'( Q) is the part of D( Q) which consists of 
such events that are assumed simultaneously to be valid， the.equation 
L( Q')ニ E(Q)UD'(Q)
will define a proposition Q' after some addition ofaxioms， to make a theorem of which L 
( Q') is the level. The addi tional axioms are claimed to make the events of D' ( Q) valid and 
thus the proto-construction is extended. The theorem Q' is to be provable in this extended 
construct!O日
In the theory of objectivism， a heuristic principle of logic shall be found in that， whatever 
sort of relation is found and taken up， itis expected to be descriptive， that is， the law of 
excluded middle is expected thereby to be conformed to. The previous definition of 
代elementwisewell-definedけ predicate(in Sect. 3) may also be recurred in connection with this 
principle. Thus the (proto-) construction of an objectivism is expected to be provided with 
a two-valued system of logic 
However， ifexactly two-valuedly should a1 our steps of analysis be destined， the notion 
of undecidability might not be allowed to be raised. So then， an undecidable event should be 
taken as of imperfect descriptivity， or to be an event which could口otbe perfectly defined 
out 
If really no undecidable event is found， we may continue our happy investigations under 
two-valued logic. However， mathematics has sometimes experienced real undecidabilities. 
These events have surely given us opportunities to extend our construction through addi 
tional axiomatization. The imperfectness of descriptivity above pointed out， might always 
己uggestthe implication of some possible extensibility on axiomatics， with some renovation 
too if needed. As a matter of fact， an event may not easily be seen whether decidable or no， 
until any proof is discovered about its decidability. If we cannot renOllnce an object of being 
regarded as an objectivist event and if we cannot discover any proof to admit it to be a 
decidable one， there is undeniable possibility that it may be an undecieable one 
Presumptively， to admit a statement 
y=ρ(f， Y) 
to give an objectivist event in our construction， isto accept it as a descriptive event， since an 
objectivist construction is， as previously explained， to be dominated by a bivalent system of 
10又ic. Thus， ifwe accept yas 2n event， itmust be that f( Y) is either valid (or true) 
or invalid (or false)， i e.， 
トρ(f， Y).V.~ ト ρ (f， Y)， 
that is， the event Y mllst be uniqllely determined either to be valid or to be invalid. On this 
occasion， though the alternative of two validity values might be thought certainly to be left 
to free selection， our decision should be laid down through deliberate contemplation， par 
ticularly 0口epistemologicalgrounds. Such is the objectivist manner of decision. 
lncidentally， ifboth y and ~ y are to be r百lOunced，i t must be that the sentence ρ(f，Y) 
itself cannot be admitted to the language Lu， that is，ρ(f， Y) is a meaningless sentence and to 
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be renounced from Lu. 
7. HistoricaI Contingency 
The analysis of the level L(P) of an objectivist proposition P is of course correlated to 
the proof of the validity of P. Particularly， ifP is rendered "('V n = 1，2…)(f( n) is true)"， 
then defining as 
and 
we have 
αn = (f ( n)is true) 
Nェ{1，2，…}， 
L(P)=UnεN{αn}. 
If there to date is found no proof of P except that 
('V mεM)(f( m) is valid). 
then， for nεN -M， f( n) is neither known to be valid nor to be invalid. However， itmay 
not be denied out that， in the future， som k may be found such that 
hε N-M. & ./(k) is invalid. (7.1) 
If for any particular value of n we can always examine and determine the validi ty of f( n)， the 
set M will evidently be increased. However， the existence of such a k posited by (7.1) may 
not be convinced untii it is really discovered. We say such a phenomenon as the existence 
of a k above-mentioned to be a historical conti刀:gency.
The proposition P above-stated seems apparently to be solvable， because it must be 
either true or false. However， itis also possible to be actully unsolvable only because the 
existence of its counterexample (i. e.， the case of (7.1) is to date a historical contingency. 
Thus the proposition P should not be taken as undecidable， but it might be said that the 
validi ty of P is hanged in a historical dilernma. 
Mathematical Semina;γ01 the Muroγan Inst. T，ι'h.， Hokkaido 
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